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Abstract
In the light of the recent financial crisis, we take a panel cointegration approach that
allows for structural breaks to the analysis of the determinants of sovereign bond yield
spreads in nine economies of the European Monetary Union. We find evidence for a level
break in the cointegrating relationship. Moreover, results show that (i) fiscal imbalances
– namely expected government debt-to-GDP differentials – are the main long-run drivers
of sovereign spreads; (ii) liquidity risks and cumulated inflation differentials have non-
negligible weights; but (iii) all conclusions are ultimately connected to whether or not
the sample of countries is composed of members of an Optimal Currency Area (OCA). In
particular, we establish (i) that results are overall driven by those countries not passing the
OCA test; and (ii) that investors closely monitor and severely punish the deterioration of
expected debt positions of those economies exhibiting significant gaps in competitiveness.
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1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis, which escalated in the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2010,
has sparked big debates about its causes and possible solutions, both in academia and in policy
institutions. Since the start of the EMU and before the financial crisis, spreads on 10-year
sovereign bond yields relative to the German benchmark were small.1 With the financial crisis
the picture completely changed. By the spring of 2009 the Greek sovereign bond spread had
reached almost 300 basis points and by 2010 it had skyrocketed to over 1000 basis points (see
Figure 1). Investors started to question the ability of certain EMU governments of meeting
their debt obligations and began requiring higher and higher risk premia.
What are the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU? The empirical
literature has identified both a common international time-varying factor – commonly dubbed
as international risk aversion – and country specific factors – in particular default and liquidity
risk – as potential determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU. However, both
in academic debates and in the context of policy-making, no clear consensus has arisen. As
far as the default risk is concerned, Faini (2006), Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) and Bernoth et
al. (2012) find that the budget balance and the stock of government debt have, on average, a
significant impact on sovereign bond spreads, whereas Codogno et al. (2003) find that public
debt plays a role only for Italy and Spain. As regards the liquidity risk component, Codogno
et al. (2003) and Sgherri and Zoli (2009) find that liquidity explains only a small fraction
of sovereign spreads, while Gomez-Puig (2006) and Barrios et al. (2009) show that liquidity
is more important to explain euro area sovereign spreads. With respect to international risk
aversion, Attinasi et al. (2010) show that this factor has substantially contributed to the change
in sovereign bond spreads during the financial crisis.
This paper adds to this debate by taking a long-run approach to the analysis of the deter-
minants of sovereign bond yield spreads in nine EMU economies (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) relative to Germany, by looking
at the issue from the viewpoint of the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA).2 In particular,
we argue (i) that long-run determinants of sovereign bond spreads are more relevant for policy-
makers when they have to decide whether, and to what extent, structural policy interventions
are needed to reduce sovereign bond yield differentials and (ii) that investors take OCA issues,
and in particular diverging competitiveness among EMU members, seriously into account when
they have to assign and price sovereign default risk.
In order to take the first point into consideration – and this is also the first innovation of
the paper relative to the existing literature – we base our investigation on recently-developed
panel cointegration techniques that treat cross-sectional dependence via factor models, allow
1Pagano and von Thadden (2004) argue that the exchange rate risk elimination and institutional factors
contributed to the small sovereign spreads observed prior to the financial crisis. Barrios et al. (2009) look at
EMU sovereign spread determinants during the financial crisis and argue that in the pre-crisis period there was
also an underestimation of risk.
2In order to have a sufficiently large sample we consider founding members of the euro in addition to Greece,
which joined the eurozone in 2001. Ireland and Luxembourg are left out as data are not available for all the
variables of the empirical model.
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Figure 1: Spreads on 10-year sovereign bond yields vis-a`-vis Germany in the EMU
!
! Source: Authors’ computations on Bloomberg data.
for potential breaks, and are robust to endogeneity. In fact, as regards cross-sectional depen-
dence, we conjecture – and empirically test – that aspects of country interdependence, such
as the economic and financial integration processes, the Maastricht convergence criteria, and
the common monetary policy framework, cannot be neglected. In addition, given the evident
shift in the level of sovereign bond yield spreads experienced during the financial crisis and the
subsequent sovereign debt crisis (reported in Figure 1), we believe that any analysis dealing
with the determinants of sovereign spreads should take potential breaks into account. In this
paper, we tackle these issues by testing for panel cointegration with break using the approach
of Westerlund and Edgerton (2008).
As far as the second point is concerned – and this is also the second novel feature of the
paper – in addition to the standard measures of default and liquidity risk, we include cumulated
inflation differentials among our explanatory variables, to capture asymmetric shocks leading to
a divergence in competitiveness. In fact, even small differences in inflation rates, if persistent,
can lead to sizable changes in relative price levels. As shown in Figure 2, since the start of
the monetary union, cumulated inflation differentials among EMU countries have persistently
diverged. As noted by Estrada et al. (2012), in principle, persistent inflation differentials may
both be a benign phenomenon explained by a structural convergence process according to a
Balassa-Samuelson type of argument, and the source of long-lasting and damaging losses of
competitiveness.3 In order the former type of argument to hold, however, inflation rates should
be positively correlated with the difference between labor productivity growth in the traded
3The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis states that in response to a rise in productivity in the tradable goods
sector – if labor is sufficiently mobile across sectors – wages will grow both in this sector and in the non-tradable
sector. As the wage increase in the non-tradable sector is not matched by an increase in productivity, this will
raise costs and prices in the non-tradable goods sector and will lead to a rise in inflation.
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Figure 2: Cumulated inflation differentials vis-a`-vis Germany in the EMU
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Source: Authors’ computations on Eurostat data.
versus non-tradable sectors. While there is some evidence that this effect can justify some
inflation differentials in the euro area, a consensus seems to have emerged around the claim that
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis cannot be the general explanation of the persistent inflation
differentials across EMU members (ECB, 2003; Estrada et al., 2012). In particular, Estrada
et al. (2012) argue that the heterogeneous inertial components of price and wage-setting rules
across the EMU, such as those caused by wage indexation clauses, play a predominant role.
Given the EMU fixed exchange rate regime, countries that have experienced persistent positive
inflation differentials, have been subject to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As noted
by De Grauwe and Ji (2012), a country experiencing a real appreciation is likely to bump
into problems of competitiveness which in turn may lead to current account deficits and debt
problems.4 Regardless of the source of the imbalances, the appreciation of the real exchange
rate for some EMU members has represented a gradual large asymmetric shock.5 As a result,
one of the theoretical conditions for an OCA, which requires that a shock in one country should
be sufficiently correlated with that in the rest of the union, or that the union has put in place
measures to balance out asymmetric shocks, has clearly been violated (see Mundell, 1961).6
As far as our empirical results are concerned, we find evidence for a level break in the
4Also other measures of real exchange rate variations are used in the literature (see Arghyrou and Kontonikas,
2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; Gibson et al., 2012).
5According to the literature, imbalances within the eurozone may be due to increasing cross-border investment
since the Euro (Krugman, 2012), lower short and long interest rates in troubled countries (Wren Lewis, 2012)
and different unit labor costs (Levy, 2012).
6The other conditions are: i) mobility in the labor market which can help adjust to asymmetric shocks
(Mundell, 1961); ii) trade integration among countries in a Monetary Union which generates benefits due to the
use of the same currency (Mundell, 1961); iii) a high degree of mutual openness (McKinnon, 1963); iv) a high
degree of diversity of production and fiscal integration (Kenen, 1969).
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cointegrating relationship, which we ascribe to the EMU sovereign debt crisis. This indicates
that, after the crisis, the expected higher risk awareness of investors keeps government bond
yield spreads at a higher level than in the pre-crisis period.
Moreover, results point at fiscal imbalances – in particular expected government debt-to-
GDP differentials – as the main drivers of sovereign spreads, although liquidity risks have a
non-negligible weight. Cumulated inflation differentials turn out to be a significant variable,
its importance being of the same order of magnitude as liquidity risk. But, perhaps most
importantly, their inclusion among the regressors allows us to establish that the conclusions we
draw on sovereign bond yield spreads determinants are closely interlinked to whether or not
diverging competitiveness significantly affects sovereign bond yield spreads themselves.
In particular, we argue that a statistical significance attached to cumulated inflation differ-
entials is an indication that the economies included in the sample of countries do not belong
to an OCA. In fact, if shocks were sufficiently correlated or if the monetary union were able
to absorb and balance out asymmetric shocks, then cumulated inflation differentials would be
small and unimportant for sovereign bond yield spread determination.7 We iteratively run this
test by excluding one country at a time from the full sample of countries, starting from that
with the highest cumulated inflation differential relative to Germany, and going forward until
such a variable becomes statistically insignificant. This process leads (i) to a grouping of coun-
tries into two categories corresponding to EMU core (Austria, Finland, France, Germany and
the Netherlands) and EMU periphery (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and (ii) to
the finding that cointegrated panel regression results are clearly driven by the inclusion of the
observations belonging to the peripheral EMU economies considered. In fact, when such obser-
vations are excluded, debt-to-GDP differentials turn out to be the least important determinant
of the sovereign bond yield spread, while expected budget balance differentials and the liquidity
risk carry the highest weights.
It is noteworthy that while in the sample of peripheral countries a one-percent-point rise
in the expected public-debt-to-GDP ratio differential leads, on average, to an 8.63 basis points
increase in the sovereign bond yield spread; in the restricted sample pooling only core EMU
economies, the same increase in the expected public-debt-to-GDP ratio differential leads, on
average, to an increase in the sovereign spread of only 0.46 basis points. These results clearly
unveil the fact that international investors heavily punish the deterioration of expected debt
positions of those countries that face competitiveness gaps and hence are not being perceived
as OCA members.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed in
the estimation. Section 3 outlines the econometric methodology. Section 4 reports and discusses
the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and highlights policy implications. Technical details
are appended to the paper.
7For an analysis on the impact of economic and institutional asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary
policy in the euro area see Aksoy et al. (2002).
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2 Data
Our panel dataset contains monthly data of nine euro-area countries over the period 2001:1-
2011:12. The countries, selected on the basis of data availability, are Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In the remainder of the paper
subscript i refers to the cross-sectional dimension (country) and subscript t refers to the time
dimension (month).
The variable to be explained is the ten-year government bond yield spread over Germany
(rit). Data are taken from Bloomberg. The remainder of this section provides a rationale for
the choice of potential explanatory variables.
As a measure of a country’s creditworthiness, we use the forecast of the ratios of government
budget balance to GDP (GBit) and debt to GDP (DBit) as differences vis-a`-vis Germany’s
counterparts. The rationale behind the use of these two expected fiscal variables is that they
represent two of the main sources of information for investors to form expectations on a country’s
fiscal position and the associated default risk. Given its prominent role in the euro area, we use
the European Commission Forecasts which were released on a bi-annual basis over our sample
period.8 In our database, the value of budget balance and debt ratios are updated every time
new forecasts are published (also Attinasi et al., 2010; Favero and Missale, 2012 adopt a similar
procedure).
To capture the liquidity risk component (also explored by Codogno et al., 2003; Gomez-Puig,
2006; Barrios et al., 2009; and Sgherri and Zoli, 2009), we use the bid-ask spread (differences vis-
a`-vis Germany) on ten-year sovereign bonds available in Bloomberg (BASit). This component
denotes the difference in price between the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay for an
asset and the lowest price at which a seller is willing to sell it. A rise in the bid-ask spread
represents a deterioration of liquidity conditions and this may affect the corresponding sovereign
yield spread. Fleming (2003) analyzes this measure of liquidity risk with US data and shows
that the bid-ask spread is a useful measure for assessing and tracking Treasury market liquidity.
In fact it can be calculated quickly and easily with data that are widely available and it is highly
correlated with episodes of reported poor liquidity in the expected manner.9
Given that the literature considers also the international risk aversion as one determinant
of sovereign bond yield spreads (see Attinasi et al., 2010 among others), we also consider the
inclusion of a variable capturing this phenomenon, e.g. measured by the US corporate Baa-Aaa
spread, among our regressors. As this is common to all countries, we subject it to a DF-
GLS unit root test. Results show that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at 5
percent significance level (test statistics = -2.488). The stationarity of the time-varying degree
of international risk aversion indicates that it is a phenomenon influencing short-run variations
in sovereign yield spreads – e.g. Attinasi et al. (2010) find it to be relevant during the financial
8The forecasts are available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/ publica-
tions/european economy/forecasts en.htm. In 2012 the European Commission started releasing these
forecasts more frequently.
9Conversely, Fleming (2003) also finds that quote size, trade size, and on-the-run/off-the-run yield spread are
found to be only modest proxies for market liquidity.
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crisis – but not long-run fluctuations. As a result, we exclude it from our empirical model
specification.
Finally, as a measure of competitiveness gaps, we use cumulated inflation differentials with
respect to Germany (CIDit), derived using the monthly harmonized indices of consumer prices
available in the EUROSTAT database. In fact, while there is some evidence that the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis can justify some inflation differentials in the euro area, a consensus seems
to have emerged around the claim that this cannot be the general explanation of the persistent
inflation differentials across EMU members (ECB, 2003; Estrada et al., 2012) and that persis-
tent inflation differentials are a source of long-lasting and damaging losses of competitiveness
(Estrada et al., 2012). Given the fixed exchange rate regime of the EMU, this variable cap-
tures the relative variation in the real exchange rate, reflecting different potential sources of
imbalances. For instance, De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue that a country experiencing a real
appreciation is likely to bump into problems of competitiveness, which in turn may lead to cur-
rent account deficits and debt problems. This is the reason why investors may require, ceteris
paribus, an additional risk premium if they observe large and persistent inflation differentials.
3 Econometric methodology
The discussion on the variables of interest in Section 2 leads to the following specification for
an empirical model on long-run determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads:
rit = αi1 + α2DBit + α3CIDit + α4BASit + α5GBit + εit, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T, (1)
where αj, j = 1, ...5 are coefficients to be estimated, the notation on the regressand and the
regressors is that described in Section 2 and εit is an error term.
To estimate equation (1) we have to take three important econometric issues into account.
First, we cannot ignore the fact that the countries under investigation are closely interconnected,
hence it is very likely that the variables feature cross-sectional dependence (CD). Likely sources
of such a form of dependence are the economic and financial integration processes, the Maastricht
convergence criteria and the common monetary policy framework, among others. Second, the
variables in our specification are likely to exhibit a unit root. Hence, given that we are interested
in establishing a long-run relationship between bond yield spreads and its determinants, if we
verify that the variables in equation (1) are indeed non-stationary, we need to determine whether
these are linked by a cointegrating relationship. Third, it is likely that structural breaks may
have taken place around the EMU sovereign debt crisis. For instance, Figure 1 shows that
sovereign bond yields vis-a`-vis Germany in the EMU experienced a visible level shift as a result
of which, in the case of many countries, their post-2009 average is one or two orders of magnitude
higher. This is an indication that breaks might have taken place both in the unit root processes
of the variables in questions and within their cointegrating relationship.
The presence of CD – for which we also formally test using the procedures developed by
Breusch and Pagan (1980), Pesaran (2004), and Ng (2006) – dictates the choice of appropriate
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unit root and cointegration tests, as well as of an appropriate estimator. We proceed in three
steps.
1. We test for non-stationarity in the data using the testing procedure developed by Bai
and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) on each variable of the empirical model. In particular, this
procedure employs panel unit root statistics pooling the modified Sargan-Bhargava tests
for individual series taking structural breaks and cross-dependence into account through
the common factors model proposed by Bai and Ng (2004). Details on the test statistics
are provided in Appendix A.
2. We investigate on the existence of a cointegrating relationship for our empirical model
using the panel cointegration tests proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2008), the null
hypothesis of which is that of no cointegration. These tests can be used under very general
conditions (heteroskedastic and correlated errors, individual-specific intercepts and time
trend, cross-section dependence and unknown breaks both in the intercept and slope of
the cointegrated regression). Details on these test statistics are provided in Appendix B.
3. If we find cointegration in step 2, we estimate the long-run relationship (1) among the
variables of interest using the continuously-updated fully-modified (CUP-FM) estimator
developed by Bai and Kao (2006).10 This estimator takes both cross-sectional dependence
and endogeneity into account. While the former is tackled via a common factor struc-
ture, the latter is treated via an appropriate variable transformation exploiting long-run
covariances, as reported in Appendix C. This is particularly relevant for our analysis.
For instance, while it is plausible to think that expectations of worse (better) fiscal posi-
tions lead to higher (lower) sovereign spreads, it is also plausible to conjecture that higher
(lower) spreads lead to worse (better) fiscal conditions through an increase (decrease)
of debt servicing costs. Similar arguments apply to the relationship between sovereign
spreads and the measure of liquidity risk. Failure to correct for endogeneity would lead to
inconsistent estimates of the coefficients. In this paper, this issue is tackled by employing
the CUP-FM estimator that, by construction, corrects for endogeneity.
4 Results
Three tests, the results of which are reported in Table 1, point at a clear-cut evidence of cross-
sectional dependence for all variables. This reinforces our prior conjecture based on economic
considerations. In particular we run the LM test by Breusch and Pagan (1980), the CD test by
Pesaran (2004), and the standardized Spacing Variance Ratio (SPR) by Ng (2006).11
In order to check for the presence of unit roots in the data, we apply the panel unit root
tests of Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) allowing for the presence of a break both in the mean
10On the use of this estimator see also Costantini and Gutierrez (2013) and Costantini et al. (2013).
11For a recent contribution employing the CD test see e.g. Camarero et al. (2013). Details on the SPR are
provided by Ng (2006) and Carrion-i-Silvestre and German-Soto (2009). For a recent survey on large panel data
models with cross-sectional dependence see Chudik and Pesaran (2013).
8
Table 1: Cross-sectional dependence test results
Variable Breusch-Pagan’s LM(a) Pesaran’s CD(b)
Ng’s test(c)
ϑ S L W
rit 1005.676 55.597 0.083 -1.732 1.793 3.448
(0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.036) (0.000)
DBit 1523.857 19.554 0.083 -1.732 2.153 5.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.016) (0.000)
CIDit 518.149 34.748 0.083 -1.732 3.290 1.093
(0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.000) (0.137)
BASit 401.074 41.755 0.083 -1.732 3.866 2.495
(0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.000) (0.006)
GBit 844.278 46.651 0.139 -1.553 1.883 4.180
(0.000) (0.000) (0.939) (0.030) (0.000)
Notes: In the three tests the null hypothesis is that of cross-sectional independence. P-values are reported in
parenthesis. (a) The Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test is distributed as a χ2 under the null hypothesis. (b)
Pesaran (2004) shows that under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence CD
d→ N(0, 1). (c) The
test by Ng (2006) is carried out by splitting the whole (W ) sample of (ordered) spacings at ϑ ∈ (0, 1), so that
the group of small (S) correlation coefficients and the group of large (L) correlation coefficients can be defined.
The null hypothesis of independence is tested for the small, large and the whole sample using the standardized
Spacing Variance Ratio (SVR) in Ng (2006), which under the null hypothesis of independence converges to the
standard Normal distribution. For further details on spacing see Ng (2006).
and in the trend. As shown in Table 2, we find that the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Then, given non-stationarity, we test for panel cointegration among the five variables de-
scribed in Section 2. In particular, we run three versions of the test of Westerlund and Edgerton
(2008): (i) in the absence of any break; (ii) in the presence of solely a level break, i.e. just in
the intercept of the cointegrating relationship; and (iii) in the presence of a regime shift, i.e.
a break also in the slope of the relationship. The results in Table 3 show that while the null
hypothesis of no panel cointegration in the absence of any break and with regime shift cannot
be rejected, the two tests Zτ and Zφ reject the null hypothesis of no panel cointegration with
level break at a 5 percent and marginally at a 10 percent significance level, respectively.12
Both the Bai-Carrion-i-Silvestre and the Westerlund-Edgerton procedure are very conve-
nient because not only do they allow conducting panel unit root and cointegration testing in
the presence of breaks but they also allow estimating the dates in which the breaks have most
likely occurred. In Figure 3 we report the estimated break dates both for the unit root pro-
cesses and the cointegrating relationship.13 In the latter, all break dates are estimated to have
occurred between 2008 and 2010.14 Noticeably, for most countries, the estimated level break in
the cointegrating relationship is sometime in 2010, the year in which the sovereign debt crisis
12Given that the regime shift model nests the level break model, it is possible that the null hypothesis is not
rejected in the former case due to lack of power. The residuals (reported in Appendix D) of our panel regression
(which takes the level break into account) do not exhibit a worrying behaviour with respect to the presence of
further breaks.
13Expected government-budget-to-GDP differentials do not display breaks.
14In order not to exclude potential breaks that may have occurred during the financial and sovereign debt
crisis, in searching for breaks, we set a trimming of 0.10.
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Table 2: Panel unit root test results
Variables
Break in the mean Break in the trend
Z P Pm Z P Pm Z∗ P∗ P∗m
rit -2.136 4.093 42.556 -1.225 4.415 44.493 6.344 -2.075 5.552
DBit 0.571 -1.528 8.830 -1.589 0.776 22.655 -0.736 0.303 19.819
CIDit 3.979 -2.056 5.664 -0.674 0.996 23.974 -0.710 1.318 25.908
BASit -2.493 26.165 174.992 -1.281 5.420 50.523 14.697 0.227 19.362
GBit -1.043 -0.406 15.562 -0.418 0.097 18.581 -0.418 0.097 18.581
Notes: (a) Z, P and Pm denote the test statistics developed by Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009), the 5%
critical values of which are 1.645, -1.645 and 50.998, respectively. (b) Z∗, P∗, and P∗
m
refer to the corresponding
statistics obtained using the p-values of the simplified MSB statistics. (c) The number of common factors is 1.
(d) The maximum number of breaks allowed is 3. To determine the breaks, the procedure of Bai and Perron
(1998) is used (for details see Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2009). Details on the computation of Z, P, Pm,
Z∗,P∗, and P∗
m
are provided in Appendix A. (e) No simplifed test for model 1 (see equation (A.4) in Appendix)
is provided by Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009).
Table 3: Panel cointegration test results
Zτ (N) Zφ (N)
No break -0.384 -0.024
(0.350) (0.491)
Level break -1.848 -1.232
(0.032) (0.109)
Regime shift -1.186 -0.705
(0.118) (0.240)
Notes: (a) The number of lags in the test regressions for both LM tests is selected using the procedure of Campbell
and Perron (1991). (b) The number of common factors is set equal to 1. (c) The breaks are determined by
grid-search at the minimum of the sum of squared residuals (see details in Westerlund and Edgerton, 2008). (d)
P-values in parentheses are for a one-sided test based on the normal distribution.
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Figure 3: Estimates of break dates for unit roots and the cointegrating relationship
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escalated according to many commentators and institutions such as the European Central Bank
(ECB, 2010). In particular in Italy and Spain the break is estimated to have occurred in the
same month of October 2010, while in Greece and Portugal the estimated break occurs slightly
earlier on (May 2010). The break in the intercept indicates that, after the crisis, the expected
higher risk awareness of investors keeps government bond yield spreads at a higher level than
in the pre-crisis period.
Having found evidence of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity, and cointegration
makes the CUP-FM an appropriate estimator for equation (1), which we estimate taking also
the level break into account with dummies.
The results for the full sample of countries are reported in Table 4-(a). We report both
the results obtained using the levels of the variables constructed in line with Section 2 and
using standardized variables. We conduct the latter exercise in order to make the variables
adimensional and assess the relative importance of the various determinants of sovereign bond
yield spreads. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at any conventional level
and carry the expected sign.15
In our specification, public debt and the government budget balance represent those deter-
minants most directly linked with sovereign default risk as they capture deterioration in fiscal
conditions. Both theory and common sense suggest that spreads should widen when fiscal con-
ditions deteriorate, e.g. when public debt rise and/or the government budget balance falls,
and viceversa. The estimated coefficients indeed confirm this hypothesis and highlight a key
role for the default risk in the relationship. In fact, on one hand, a one-percent-point rise in
the expected public-debt-to-GDP ratio differential yields an average increase in the sovereign
bond yield spread of 7.56 basis points. On the other hand, a surge in the expected budget-
balance-to-GDP-ratio differential of one percent point generates a reduction in the spread of
9.33 basis points. Government debt turns out to be the most important determinant of the
spread amongst all the determinants encompassed by our specification, while the budget bal-
ance carries the smallest weight. This finding seems reasonable if it is looked at through the lens
of investors who need to price risk. In fact, it implies that these assign a greater importance to
a proxy of a long history of fiscal conditions – the accumulation of the stock of debt over time –
rather than to possibly one-off fiscal conditions exemplified by the government budget balance.
Liquidity risk, proxied by the bid-ask spread, is the second most important determinant of
the sovereign bond yield spread. In particular, a one-basis-point increase in this measure of
liquidity risk leads to a ceteris paribus higher liquidity premium of 4.41 basis points. In other
words, the higher the level of liquidity in the government bond market, the lower the sovereign
spread, and the extent to which this occurs is not only statistically but also economically
important.
Cumulated inflation differentials come third in the ranking of determinants, although their
15In Appendix D we report the standardized residuals from the panel regression. These are typical residuals
obtained from a cointegrating relationship, in that they exhibit some persistence but they are stationary (mean-
reverting) and do not exhibit any abrupt shifts in the level. Having controlled for the level break, residuals
display a comparable behaviour in relative terms.
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Table 4: Panel estimation results
(a) Full sample (b) Greece excluded
Regressor Coefficient Level Standardized Level Standardized
Expected gov. debt/GDP diff. α2 0.0756
∗∗∗ 0.8936∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.2414∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0397) (0.0026) (0.0262)
Cumulated inflation diff. α3 0.2004
∗∗∗ 0.4108∗∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.1314∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0397) (0.0145) (0.0250)
Bid-ask spread α4 0.0441
∗∗∗ 0.5031∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.2945∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0050) (0.0015) (0.0048)
Exp. gov. balance/GDP diff. α5 −0.0933∗∗∗ −0.1151∗∗∗ −0.1037∗∗∗ −0.1207∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0149) (0.0077) (0.0089)
(c) Greece & Spain (d) Greece, Spain &
excluded Portugal excluded
Regressor Coefficient Level Standardized Level Standardized
Expected gov. debt/GDP diff. α2 0.0171
∗∗∗ 0.1853∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.2616∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0280) (0.0017) (0.0825)
Cumulated inflation diff. α3 0.0827
∗∗∗ 0.1030∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.4192∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0204) (0.0102) (0.0466)
Bid-ask spread α4 0.0952
∗∗∗ 0.3246∗∗∗ 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.1966∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0048) (0.0035) (0.0077)
Exp. gov. balance/GDP diff. α5 −0.0885∗∗∗ −0.0989∗∗∗ −0.0583∗∗∗ −0.2770∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0045) (0.0216)
(e) Greece, Spain, (f) Greece, Spain,
Portugal & Italy Portugal, Italy &
excluded Belgium excluded
Regressor Coefficient Level Standardized Level Standardized
Expected gov. debt/GDP diff. α2 0.0032
∗∗∗ 0.2122∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0898) (0.0013) (0.0067)
Cumulated inflation diff. α3 0.0363
∗∗∗ 0.2324∗∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0102
(0.0092) (0.0623) (0.0076) (0.0075)
Bid-ask spread α4 0.1503
∗∗∗ 0.4991∗∗∗ 0.1160∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0150) (0.0036) (0.0017)
Exp. gov. balance/GDP diff. α5 −0.0543∗∗∗ −0.4236∗∗∗ −0.0475∗∗∗ −0.0544∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0306) (0.0030) (0.0035)
Notes: The dependent variable is the ten-year government bond yield spread over Germany (rit). *, **, ***
denote significance at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Panel estimation results: peripheral vs. core countries
(a) Peripheral (b) Core
Regressor Coefficient Level Standardized Level Standardized
Expected gov. debt/GDP diff. α2 0.0863
∗∗∗ 1.0143∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0536) (0.0013) (0.0067)
Cumulated inflation diff. α3 0.2253
∗∗∗ 0.4609∗∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0102
(0.0305) (0.0639) (0.0076) (0.0075)
Bid-ask spread α4 0.0444
∗∗∗ 0.5454∗∗∗ 0.1160∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0066) (0.0036) (0.0017)
Exp. gov. balance/GDP diff. α5 −0.0796∗∗∗ −0.1014∗∗∗ −0.0475∗∗∗ −0.0544∗∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0251) (0.0030) (0.0035)
Notes: The dependent variable is the ten-year government bond yield spread over Germany (rit). *, **, ***
denote significance at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
weight is of comparable magnitude as liquidity risk. In particular, a one-percent increase in
cumulated inflation differentials leads to a rise of 20 basis points in the spread. This result
agrees with De Grauwe and Ji (2012).
In a monetary union, significant cumulated inflation differentials unveil competitiveness gaps
as they imply an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This in turn represents a failure of the
economies belonging to the monetary union in what should be their aim of moving towards higher
and higher degrees of economic integration, in order to ultimately tick the boxes necessary for
OCA membership. Our estimates show that investors do take these considerations into account
when pricing sovereign risk. Therefore, we argue that a statistical significance attached to
cumulated inflation differentials is an indication that the economies included in the sample of
countries do not belong to an OCA. We run this OCA test iteratively by excluding the economies
with the highest cumulated inflation differential from the full sample of countries one at a time,
until the estimated coefficient attached to the variable becomes statistically insignificant. The
residual countries will then represent economies that may appertain to an OCA in the eyes of
investors who have to price sovereign risk. Among the economies included in the full sample of
countries, the procedure (see Tables 4-(b)-(f)) excludes, in the order, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Italy and Belgium (arguably peripheral EMU economies) from the OCA. In the restricted sample
– including Austria, Finland, France, the Netherlands along with Germany (arguably core EMU
economies) – inflation differentials, although they display considerable variation (see Figure 2),
do not play a significant role in sovereign bond yield spreads determination. We argue that this
is due to the fact that these countries face much smaller competitiveness gaps and investors
perceive them as belonging to an OCA.
A comparison between Tables 4-(a) and Table 4-(f) also highlights that the results obtained
with the full sample of countries are mainly driven by those economies that are not perceived as
belonging to an OCA. In particular, in the restricted sample of countries, expected government
debt-to-GDP differentials turn out to be the least important determinant of the sovereign bond
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yield spread, while expected budget balance differentials and the liquidity risk carry the highest
weights. Table 5 constrasts the results obtained using observations of the restricted sample of
peripheral countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Belgium) with those obtained using
only observations of core EMU economies (Austria, Finland, France, the Netherlands along
with Germany). The same one-percent-point rise in the expected public-debt-to-GDP ratio
differential yields an average increase in the sovereign bond yield spread of 8.63 basis points
in peripheral EMU countries and only 0.46 basis points in the restricted OCA (core) sample.
The results obtained using standardized variables confirm the difference in the ranking of de-
terminants identifiable in Table 4. Such findings are informative on the fact that expected debt
positions of those countries facing problems of competitiveness due to a sustained appreciation
of the real exchange rate, and not being perceived as OCA members, are closely monitored by
investors and their deterioration is much more heavily punished.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper provides useful information for policy makers facing the difficult task of tackling high
sovereign bond spreads with the aim of fostering greater public finance stability and ultimately
guaranteeing EMU survival. Results primarily point at expected fiscal imbalances (namely
expected government debt-to-GDP differentials) and liquidity risks as the main determinants
of sovereign bond yield spreads in the long run. We find evidence for a level break in the
relationship, occurring during the sovereign debt crisis.
These results suggest that some EMU countries do need fiscal consolidation in order to re-
move imbalances and bring sovereign spreads to acceptable levels. Across the EMU, however,
this is still a time of weak private demand and fiscal tightening may worsen economic conditions
even further with a perverse effect on government debt-to-GDP ratios themselves. In the liter-
ature, there are ongoing debates on the appropriate timing (slow versus fast) and composition
(expenditure versus tax-based) of fiscal consolidations and on whether high levels of public debt
harm economic growth (see e.g. Batini et al., 2012; Cantore et al. 2013; and Panizza and
Presbitero, 2013 among others). Our paper does not take a stance in these particular debates.
Nevertheless, by looking at the issue through the lens of the OCA theory, it is able to establish
that this is only one important side of the coin.
The other side, which we deem as equally important, is the extent to which EMU countries
do form an OCA and, above all, whether investors take this information into account when they
have to assess and price sovereign default risk. Our empirical analysis finds that cumulated
inflation differentials have non-negligible weights in sovereign bond yield spread determination.
If our full sample of countries comprised only OCA members, then cumulated inflation differ-
entials would be negligible and, most importantly, they would have an immaterial effect on
sovereign bond yield spreads. In fact, substantial and protracted cumulated inflation differen-
tials (i) derive from a failure of the EMU to work as an OCA and hence to absorb and balance
out asymmetric shocks and (ii) lead to a divergence of real exchange rates and competitive-
ness. Therefore, a statistical significance associated to cumulated inflation differentials can be
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interpreted as an indication that the economies in the sample do not constitute an OCA. Using
this criterion, we are able to group the countries in our sample into peripheral EMU economies
(countries that do not pass the OCA test) and core EMU economies (countries that do pass
the test) and this allows us to establish that the above results are driven by peripheral EMU
countries. In particular, within core EMU, (i) debt-to-GDP differentials cease to be the main
long-run drivers of sovereign bond yield spreads; and (ii) the same increase in the debt-to-GDP
differential leads to a dramatically smaller increase in the sovereign spread.
Such findings are noteworthy because they highlight that investors closely monitor and
severely punish the deterioration of debt positions of those economies exhibiting significant
competitiveness gaps. This suggests that policy-makers willing to reduce the burden of high
sovereign spreads in the EMU should embrace structural policies aiming at a higher level of co-
ordination of prices and wages across the union, besides well-designed consolidations programs.
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Appendix
A Panel unit root test
Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) propose panel unit root statistics that pool the modified
Sargan-Bhargava (hereafter MSB) tests for individual series taking into account structural
breaks and cross-dependence through a common factors model proposed by Bai and Ng (2004).
The common factors may be non-stationary processes, stationary processes or a combination of
both. Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) consider the following panel data model:
Xit = Dit + F
′
tpii + eit (A.1)
(I − L)Ft = C(L)ut (A.2)
(1− ρiL)eit = Hi(L)εit, (A.3)
t = 1, . . . , T and i = 1, . . . , N , where C(L) =
∑
∞
j=0 CjL
j, Hi(L) =
∑
∞
j=0 CijL
j, L is lag operator,
and ρi is the autoregressive parameter in the univariate model. The component Dit indicates
the deterministic part of the model, Ft is an (r×1) vector that accounts for the common factors
of the panel, eit is the idiosyncratic error term, µt ∼ i.i.d.(0,Σu) and εit ∼ i.i.d.(0,Σεi). Despite
the operator (1 − L) in equation (A.2), Ft does not have to be I(1). In this regard, Ft can
be I(0), I(1), or a combination of both, depending on the rank of C(1). If C(1) = 0, then
Ft is I(0). If C(1) is of full rank, then each component of Ft is I(1). If C(1) ̸= 0 but not full
rank, then some components of Ft can be I(1) and others I(0).
16 As regards the deterministic
component, Dit, Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) propose two specifications:
Model 1 : Dit = µi +
li∑
j=1
θijDUijt (A.4)
Model 2 : Dit = µi +Bit+
li∑
j=1
θijDUijt +
mi∑
k=1
γikDTikt (A.5)
where li and mi denote the structural breaks affecting the mean and the trend of a time series,
respectively, and li is not necessarily equal to mi. The dummy variables are defined as follows:
DUijt = 1 for t > T
i
aj and 0 elsewhere, and DTikt = (t−T ibk) for t > T ibk and 0 elsewhere. T iaj and
T ibk indicate the j − th and k − th dates of the break in the level and in the trend, respectively,
for the i− th individual, with j = 1, . . . , li and k = 1, . . . ,mi. Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009)
propose to combine individual MSB test statistics to test the null hypothesis of ρi = 1 for all
i = 1, . . . , N against the alternative |ρi| < 1 for some i. This approach is suitable since eit are
cross-sectionally independent (the individual statistics are free from the common factors). Bai
and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) provide two approaches for pooling individual statistics. The first
16For further details on assumptions regarding the panel data model see Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009).
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approach is based on the use of the average of the individual statistics:
Z =
√
N
MSB(λ)− ξ¯
ς¯
d−→ N(0, 1) (A.6)
with MSB(λ) = N−1
∑N
i=1 MSBi(λi), ξ¯ = N
−1
∑N
i=1 ξi and ς¯
2 = N−1
∑N
i=1 ς
2
i , where ξi and
ς2i denote the mean and the variance of the individual modified Sargan-Bhargava (MSBi(λi))
statistics respectively and λi = T
i
b/T the break fraction parameter. In order to purge the
break fraction parameter in the limiting distributions in the case of Model 2, Bai and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2009) propose another test based on the simplified MSB statistics:
Z∗ =
√
N
MSB∗(λ)− ξ¯∗
ς¯∗
d−→ N(0, 1) (A.7)
with MSB∗(λ) = N−1
∑N
i=1 MSB
∗
i (λi), ξ¯
∗ = N−1
∑N
i=1 ξ
∗
i and ς¯
∗2 = N−1
∑N
i=1 ς
∗2
i , where ξ
∗
i
and ς∗2i denote the the mean and the variance of the individual MSB
∗
i (λi) statistics, respec-
tively.17
The second approach is based on the method developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi
(2001) that pools the p-values associated with the individual tests:
P = −2
N∑
i=1
ln pi
d−→ χ2N (A.8)
Pm = −2
∑N
i=1 ln pi − 2N√
4N
d−→ N(0, 1) (A.9)
where pi denotes the individual p-value. Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) also propose a version
of P and Pm tests based on the p-values of the individual simplified MSB. They are denoted as
P∗ and P∗m, respectively.18
B Panel Cointegration tests
Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) propose two versions of a simple test for the null hypothesis of
no cointegration that can be used under very general condition (heteroskedastic and correlated
errors, individual-specific intercepts and time trend, cross-section dependence and unknown
breaks both in the intercept and slope of the cointegrated regression). The test is derived from
the Lagrange multiplier (LM)-based unit root tests (see Schmidt and Phillips, 1992; Ahn, 1993;
17As regards the individual simplified MSB statistics, see Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009).
18Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) point out that there is no need to construct a simplified test for Model 1
since this test does not depend on break fractions in limits.
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Amsler and Lee, 1995). In our empirical analysis, we consider the following model19:
yit = αi + δiDit + x
′
itβi + (Ditxit)
′
γi + zit, (B.1)
xit = xit−1 + ωit, t = 1, . . . T ; i = 1, . . . , N. (B.2)
The k-dimensional vector xit contains the regressors and is modeled as a pure random walk. The
variable Dit is a scalar break dummy such that Dit = 1 if t > T
b
i and zero otherwise. αi and βi
represent the intercept and slope before the break, while δi and γi represent the change in these
parameters at the time of the shift. ωit is an error process with mean zero and independent
across i. In equation (B.1), the error term zit is generated by the following model:
zit = λ
′
iFt + νit, (B.3)
Fjt = ρjFjt−1 + ujt, j = 1, ....k, (B.4)
φi(L)∆νit = φiνit−1 + eit, (B.5)
where φi(L) = 1−
∑pi
j=1 φijL
j is a scalar polynomial in the lag operator L, Ft is an r-dimensional
vector of unobservable common factors Fjt with j = 1, . . . , r, λi is a conformable vector of loading
parameters, ut is independent of eit and ωit for all i and t and eit is an error term with mean
zero and independent across both i and t. The relationship in (B.1) is cointegrated if φi < 0
and it is spurious if φi = 0. The tests proposed Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) are:
Zφ(N) =
√
N(LMφ(N)− E(Bφ)) (B.6)
Zτ (N) =
√
N(LM τ (N)− E(Bτ )), (B.7)
where LMφ =
1
N
∑N
i LMφ(i), LM τ =
1
N
∑N
i LMτ (i), LMφ(i) = T φˆi(ωˆi/σˆi), LMτ (i) =
φˆi
SE(φˆi)
, φˆi is the least square estimates of φi in the equation (9) in Westerlund and Edgerton
(2008), σˆi and SE(φˆi) are the estimated standard errors of the same regression (9)
C Panel estimation
In the third step of our analysis, we use the CUP-FM estimator:
βˆCUP =
[ n∑
i=1
( T∑
i=1
yˆ+i,t
(
βˆCUP
)
(xi,t − x¯i)′ − T
(
λˆ′i
(
βˆCUP
)
∆ˆ+Fεi
(
βˆCUP
)
+ ∆ˆ+µεi
(
βˆCUP
)))]
[ n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xi,t − x¯i)(xi,t − x¯i)′
]
−1
(C.1)
This estimator makes corrections for endogeneity and serial correlation. The endogeneity cor-
rection is achieved by modifying the original variable yit as follows: yˆ
+
i,t = yi,t −
(
λˆ
′
iΩˆFεi +
19Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) also consider the deterministic trend in the model. We consider the constant
only.
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Ωˆµεi
)
Ωˆ−1εi ∆xi,t. The CUP-FM is constructed by estimating parameters, long-run covariances
matrix (Ω) and factor loadings (λi). Thus βˆFM, Ωˆ and Λˆi are estimated repeatedly, until con-
vergence is reached.
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D Panel regression residuals
Figure 4: Standardized residuals from the panel regression
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